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Abstract
In this paper we attempt to shed new light on the dynamic impacts of gov-
ernment spending and technology shocks on the real exchange rate for the Euro
area. The main idea under this identification scheme is to let the data speak about
the behaviour of the interested variables. Moreover, this paper investigates the
impacts of fiscal policy and technology shock jointly in contrast to most of the
literature which just focuses on one shock only. Our investigation suggest that
the real exchange rate appreciates (falls) following an expansionary fiscal shock. It
appreciates in response to a positive technology shock as well however after an on
impact depreciation (increase) which lasts for 8 quarters.
1 Introduction
What is the behaviour of the real exchange rate following fiscal policies and technology
shocks? It is crucial to have a clear-cut answer to the main question in this paper to under-
stand the mechanism behind the exchange rate fluctuations. Real exchange rate1 across
OECD countries show significant and systematic inconsistencies from standard theories.
For instance, during 1980’s, in the late 1990s and also more recently in 2002 significant
deviation in the United States producer-price based real exchange rate occurred2.
Overall, the existing evidence appears to fail satisfying the predictions of both Mundell-
Fleming type and intertemporal business cycle models under standard calibrations. Ac-
cording to benchmark theories, relative prices of domestic goods goes up following an
expansionary government expenditure shocks. This happens since these shocks lead to
the higher total demand for domestic goods. On the other hand, productivity gains3
bring on lower relative prices as a result of higher supply of domestic goods.
1Both the real exchange rate or the terms of trade are the measure of the international relative prices.
2Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein(2008), for instance, show that during 1980’s in the United States,
manufactured goods prices changed by approximately 40 percent compared to a weighted average of the
prices of manufactured goods made in the US chief trading partners.
3We consider productivity gains as “technology shock”.
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Economists recently provide numerical estimates of the effects of an expansionary
government expenditure on exchange rate and other main economic indicators mainly
for the Unites States. These estimates are pivotal for policy making since they throw
some light on determining the appropriate size and timing of countercyclical fiscal policy
measures. Nonetheless, the empirical investigations on this central issue seem to deliver
conflicting answers up to this time. Furthermore, most studies related to the impact of
fiscal policy as well as technology shock on exchange rate are done for the U.S. and Euro
Area seems to be neglected in this regard.
Agreeing with the textbook theories, an expansionary fiscal policy should worsen the
current account and consequently appreciates the real exchange rate. The main empirical
finding which shows this impact is on the United States during the first half of the 1980s
and in the 2000s while the U.S was experiencing twin deficits. In contrast, more recent
empirical studies such as those of Kim and Roubini (2008), Monacelli and Perotti (2006),
and Ravn et al.(2007), among others, show that government spending depreciates the real
exchange rate.4 Following the productivity gains, as well, the direction and the size of
the responses of main economic indices such as hours worked, employment and exchange
rate are controversial.5
These controversies seem to root in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. As pre-
sented in the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), the main assumptions of
the DSGE models which are based on RBC theory, is that prices are flexible and firms
are optimizing agents. In the standard RBC framework, theretofore, technology shocks
changes demand for labour and raise both per capita hours worked and output and con-
sequently lowers the relative price of domestic goods. When confronted with the data,
these predictions have found little support. For example, recent empirical investigation
by Corsetti et al. (2008b), Kim and Lee (2008), and Enders and Muller (2009) find that
real exchange rates appreciate following a technology shock, captured by the terms of
trade or the relative price of consumption across countries.
The objective of this paper is to re-investigate the dynamic behaviour of exchange rate
using a new identification approach proposed by Enders et al. (2011)6 to identify fiscal
shocks and productivity gains simultaneously within an estimated VAR model. Crucially,
they employ quantitative general equilibrium model in order to determine the sign and
also the time horizons of the identification restrictions.7 The plausibility of these identi-
fication assumptions is largely related to the theoretical framework that one has chosen.
Having said that, employing a fully specified DSGE model lead to choose both the sign
restrictions and the periods that we have to impose those restrictions. While the model
is richly identified and endures robust predictions of the reaction of several key variables,
it leaves exchange rate behavior unrestricted following an expansionary government ex-
4Studies about the effects of fiscal shocks on the real exchange rate for Australia, Canada, the U.K.
and the U.S. gives somewhat mixed results, see, for example, Corsetti and Muller (2006) or Monacelli
and Perotti (2008).
5Regarding technology shocks, proof for an appreciation is built in for U.S. data. Corsetti et al.
(2008b) find an appreciation in Japan likewise. However Kim and Lee (2008) show a depreciation for
the Euro area and Japan
6Sign restriction approach is put forward initially by Uhlig (2005) and developed later in many
respects; see e.g Uhlig and Mountford (2009) and Enders et all (2011).
7Enders et al (2011) argue that this methodology is complementary to Corsetti et al. (2009a) study
in which they use sign restrictions to identify demand and productivity gains in the manufacturing
sector and investigate their impact on the real exchange rate. In their study, instead of employing a
fully specified general equilibrium model, the authors exercise sector-specific data in order to achieve
identification.
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penditure and productivity gain. Furthermore, we re-examine this controversy for the
Euro Area since the impacts of these two shocks is less empirically investigated in the
EU compared to the U.S.8
We estimate our VAR model on quarterly frequencies for the Euro Area relative to
the US for post-Bretton-Woods period but before the current financial crisis. The model
includes data for consumption, output, investment, government spending, government
budget balance, inflation, the short term interest rate and exchange rate. Our results
suggest that exchange rate appreciates (falls) after an expansionary fiscal policy in the
EU. Following a positive technology shock, however, after an on impact depreciation
(increase), exchange rate appreciates for the whole period. In overall, even though we
use an identification approach which is not often used in the recent literature, our em-
pirical findings are relatively align with the existing studies concerning the impacts of
technology shocks and fiscal shocks on exchange rate. More importantly, it is in line with
benchmark theories regarding to the impact of these two sets of shocks on exchange rate.
It seems that the facts about the exchange rate dynamics that are widely used across
different identification schemes are in particular appropriate to examine theories of the
international transmission mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the
literature. In Section 3 we show our identification scheme and explain a quantitative
business cycle model from which we determine sign restrictions. In Section 4 we illustrate
our VAR specification and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Most controversies in international macroeconomics concern the real exchange rate dy-
namics for its fluctuations are more significant and long-lasting relative to other real
variables. However, most models are unable to explain the behaviour of exchange rate.
Furthermore, international financial market assumed to be complete in most benchmark
models even though there is a well-documented lack of a consumption risk-sharing across
countries. As a means of clarifying this important aspect of the real exchange rate and
the dynamics of cross-country consumption, macro-economists turn to apply new gen-
eration of models recognized as new open Economy macroeconomics (NOEM). These
models extended the literature by taking into account nominal rigidities as a feature of
asset market or alternative features.9
The real exchange rate is characterized as the ratio of price levels between two coun-
tries. Assuming that all prices10 are sticky, economists can explain real exchange rate
fluctuations, as shown by Benigno (2004). In models which assume markets are perfect,
the real exchange rate is identical to the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption
across countries. These models are subject to perform poorly, even when they allow for
other nominal or real rigidities. One way to solve this issue is to presume that agents
cannot have access to complete markets in order to secure their assets against country-
specific shocks. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) investigate the fluctuation and
prolonged behavior of the real exchange rate by constructing a model with sticky prices.
8This is indeed a clear-cut difference of this paper with the very similar studies by Corsetti et al.
(2009a) and Enders et al. (2011).
9Some examples include Benigno (2009), Lane (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
10Including domestically produced as well as imported goods.
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Their finding suggest that monetary shocks and nominal anomalies account largely for
real exchange rate volatility.
This view, however, has been challenged by studies which emphasize the significant
role of fiscal shocks in explaining the fluctuations of exchange rates. Taking the empirical
perspective, the impacts of fiscal shocks on real economic variables, have been character-
ized in different models with forward-looking agents and finite horizons. In particular,
Frenkel and Razin (1986) focus on the impacts of tax cuts on the world interest rates,
consumption as well as the current account in a two country economy model. Daniel
(1993a,b), for instance, investigates the consequence of tax cut in a country in which
the time of a future tax increase to balance the budget is unknown. Kawai and Maccini
(1995) study the impacts of fiscal deficits on a small open economy when there is a float-
ing exchange rates regime. Governments sell bonds in order to finance its fiscal deficit
and is predicted to be financed in the future by either seignorage or tax increases or other
combination of these two.
Canzoneri et al. (2001b) argue that it is essential to have strict fiscal discipline in
common currency areas where national governments enjoy less autonomy in following
their goals. They differentiate between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. In the first
one, the nominal anchor is determined by monetary policy and moreover the exchange
rate is defined by the standard theories. In non-Ricardian regime, however, fiscal policy
is being used as the nominal anchor and appoints the exchange rate.
Looking further in the literature, one can see that even though closed-economy RBC
models11 have been successful to some extant in explaining the U.S. macroeconomic data,
open-economy versions of these models that have integrated international relationships12
have been less productive in replicating basic determinents of macroeconomic time series.
The closed-economy versions come from the fact that countries play a role in international
markets. However they dismiss the evidence that open economies have the privilege of
sharing nation-specific volatilities with other economies through the exchange of goods
and financial assets.
For instance, the extension of the Kydland-Prescott model to a two-country framework
by Backus et al.(1994) lead to a riskier investment than is shown in the industrialized
countries. Open-economy models, as well, lead to mixed results in replicating main
characteristics of international data. Countries which participate in international trade
can affect their economies’ behavior by shattering the tie between its production and
its spending on consumption and investment. This allows an economy to experience
smoother consumption during the time compared to a closed economy. They also have
larger response of investment to movements in expected rates of return. This is why
models which are featured by shocks to technology show13 larger changes in relative
prices in open-economy models relative to the corresponding closed-economy versions.
This also clarifies why technology shocks induce significant movements in the balance of
trade and exchange rate in those models. Yet, previous models comes from the fact that
nearly half of a country’s output is made of non-traded goods. This evidence is possibly
an important missing factor of existing RBC since it helps reconstruct the link between a
country’s output and its spending. As a result of all these controversies in the literature,
this paper aims to study the implications of fiscal policy in the determination of the real
11See Kydland, F., E. and Prescott, E., C., (1982) and Prescott, (1986).
12See Enrique G. Mendoza, (1991); David K. Backus et al., (1992); Marianne Baxter and Mario J.
Crucini, (1993) for more details.
13Here the assumption is that technology shocks create changes in the expected return to investment.
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exchange together the impacts of technology shock on this key economic variable.
3 Identifying government expenditure and technol-
ogy shocks
3.1 Sign restrictions
Several studies concerning to the study of macroeconomic shocks turn to employ VAR
in order to identify those shocks empirically. The identification in their model is either
based on long-run or short-run restrictions. Howeverin this paper, we use an alternative
technique of identification since the standard schemes tend to produce results which are
in conflict with the prediction of the RBC models.
Estimation of the reduced-form VAR 14widely agreed in the literature15:
Yt = Φ1Yt−1 + Φ2Yt−2 + ....+ ΦpYt−p + ǫt (1)
= Θ(L)Yt + ǫt (2)
where Yt is a n× 1 vector of data at time t, Θ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator
L of order p and ǫt is the reduced form one-step ahead prediction error. Identification of
economically meaningful shocks requires a sufficient number of restriction on the under-
lying structural model. Let ut = A
−1ǫt is a n× 1 vector of independent structural shocks
such that:
E(uu′) = Σu = In
where In is an identity matrix of order n and A is an n × n matrix. Identification of
ut requires the researcher to impose n(n − 1)/2 restrictions on matrix A. In the VAR
literature this was done by a recursive ordering of variables:
Σǫ = E(ǫt, ǫ
′
t) (3)
= AA′
where A is the Cholesky factor of Σǫ.
16
Instead of imposing a priori restriction to matrix A, in line with Uhlig (2005) and
Mountford et al. (2009), we achieve the identification of the VAR model by applying
sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a group of variables for a certain period
k = k1, ..., kn after the shock.It is shown in their paper that any impulse vector a ⊆ R
n
can be restored if there exists an n−dimensional vector q of unit length such that that
a = A˜q where Σǫ = AA
′ = A˜A˜′, and A˜ is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of the
covariates matrix, Σǫ. Note that A˜ = AQ where Q is an n× n orthogonal matrix.
As we are going to show later, we developed our sign restrictions using real business
cycle model. Assume that n is the number of structural shocks that we are going to
14Here, we have used a Bayesian procedure, following almost all the literature which produce error
bands for impulse responses, For further details relevant to this paper, see appendix B in Uhlig (2005)
15We do not use a constant as well as a trend term here in line with practically the entire literature.
They are easily included, see the appendix in Uhlig (1994) for details.
16Recursive identification impose short-run restriction based on ad-hoc ordering. This method was
used by Sims (1986). Blanchard and Sims (1986) also achieved identification by imposing short-run
restrictions. Alternatively, Blachard and Quah (1989) identified structural shocks by imposing n(n−1)/2
long-run restrictions on C(1) = [I − Φ(1)]−1.
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identify. Uhlig (2005) and Uhlig and Mountford (2009) show that identifying n shocks is
similar to identifying a rank n impulse response matrix. This is a sub-matrix of matrix
A if and only if AA
′
= Σ
′
. Impulse responses can therefore be written as:
[a(1), ..., a(n)] = AˆQ (4)
Aˆ is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σ
′
. Q is equal to [q1, ..., qn] which is an
n× ζ matrix made of orthonormal rows qs such that QQ
′
= In .
We can show that the impulse responses can be written as linear combinations of
impulse responses which are produced under Cholesky decomposition of Σ
′
. Assume that
Cji(k) is the impulse response of the jth variable at time period k to the ith shock in
the cholesky decomposition of Σ
′
. Now let’s define ci(k) = R
′ as the vector of response.
Therefore the impulse response of r
(s)
a (k) to the impulse vector of a(s) is given by
r(s)a (k) =
ζ∑
i=1
q
(s)
i ci(k) (5)
The restrictions that we use in order to obtain the identification for shock s are
(r
(s)
a (k))j ≥ 0 if jǫζ+ and (r
(s)
a (k))j ≤ 0 if jǫζ− for some subsets of the variables ζ−
and ζ+. We employ Bayesian approach for the actual estimation of our model.
17 To see
what we did in a glance, we take a draw from normal-wishart posterior for (β,Σ) and
make a standard normal matrix called M. Afterwards, we construct orthonormal matrix
Q applying QR decomposition of matrix M while we have to make sure that QQ
′
= I
and also QR =M . Finally in this part we make matrix α to calculate impulse responses.
In this identification scheme orthogonal structural shocks could lead to tight identify-
ing sign restrictions in the way that lots of draws from the Normal-Wishart posterior for
the VAR parameters (β,Σ) are not accepted since they do not allow any impulse matrices
that fits the sign restrictions. As a result, many draws receive zero prior weight, even if
only few of the restrictions are mildly not met. This issue becomes more problematic if
the number of orthogonal shocks as well as the number of variables included in the VAR
model increases. To find a solution for this complication, we let for small deviations ε
from the sign restrictions.18
3.2 Business cycle model
Here we go through the business cycle model from which we draw our sign restrictions.
The model we are using here is widely used in this literature and it features two-country
specific model in which some frictions exist.19 We employ Gali(1999) model in which there
is some degree of sticky prices that will alter the transmission of real shocks. Additionally,
one of the assumptions is that each country is specialized in producing a particular type
of good. Consumers, on the other hand, in both countries consume both goods however
in different extent. Moreover, the extension of their consumption in each country will
determine relative prices which consequently derives real exchange rate fluctuations. We
17Specifically, we apply a flat Normal-Wishart prior (see Uhlig (1994) for a detailed discussion of the
properties), while the numerical implementation follows Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2005)
18For more detailed use of literature see Enders et al.(2011)
19See, e.g., Chari et al. (2002) and Kollmann (2002)
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followed Engel (1999), Chari et al. (2002) and Enders et al. (2011) and did not take
non-traded goods into account for the US.
Before describing our sign restrictions we briefly explain the structure of the model.
The world consists of two different countries called “home” and “foreign” country.
3.2.1 Households
In each country the representative household allocate some of its resources to consume
some goods and also supply labour. There is also an endogenous discount factor in this
model which means that leisure and consumption is higher than its steady state if thee
discount factor is higher. Labour and capital are not mobile internationally. Household
in each country rent the capital they own to intermediate firm. It is also costly to adjust
the level of investment. The law of motion for capital is given by
kit+1 = (1− σ)kit + [1−Ψ(Iit/Iit−1)]Iit (6)
Where σ denotes the depreciation rate. Across countries, trade is in the form of
bonds denominated in the currency of each country. Each representative household in
each country has a budget constraint. Also in each country consumers maximize their
preference function subject to law of motion of capital, their budget constraint as well as
a non-ponzi scheme condition.
3.2.2 Final good firms
We assume that investment and consumption are composite goods that households buy
from final good firms. These firms are in perfect competition market and purchase their
inputs from monopolistic competitive firms. One of the other important assumptions
here is that we assume that the law of one price holds for the firms and therefore we
have:
PBIt (j) = StP
B
2t (j);P
A
1t(j) = StP
A
2t(j) (7)
let Ait(j) and Bit(j) denote the amount of good j which respectively is made in country
1 and 2 and used in country i to assemble the relevant final goods. These are produced
under a technology level which depends on the elasticity of substitution between foreign
and home goods and the elasticity of substitution between goods manufactured within
the same country. It also depends on the home bias in the composition of final goods.
The problem of this firm is to minimize expenditures in combining intermediate goods
subject to the technology that it is using. Furthermore, assuming that we are in the home
country, we define the real exchange rate as follows:
RXt = StP2t/P1t (8)
therefore an increase corresponds to a depreciation. 20
20The terms of trade are defined as the price of imports relative to the price of exports: PB
it
/PA
it
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3.2.3 Fiscal Policy
For fiscal policy we assume that government spending consists of the basket of interme-
diate goods. More importantly we assume that government goods are made with the
same technology that final good firms uses except that merely goods which are manu-
factured domestically enter the consumption bundle of the government. This evidence
is put forward by Corsetti and Muller (2006). They argue that the import goods as
part of government expenditure is in general less than half the import content in private
spending. Government consumption evolves as follows:
Git = (i− ρg)Gi + ρgG
1
it + ϕy(Yit − Yi)− ϕd(Dit −Di) + ε
g
it (9)
letters without time subscript refer to steady-state values; ρg shows persistence and ϕy
and ϕd demonstrate the extent in which government expenditure reacts to the deviation
of output and debt from their steady-state values. εgit, is an i.i.d. shock to current
government spending, which may have been robustly predicted n periods in advance
because, say, of institutional features of the legislative process. We also assume that tax
rates adjust to the level of debts. The government budget constrain in country i is as
follows:
Dit + P
G
it Git = τit(WitHit +R
it
kKit +Υit) +Dit +R
−1
it (10)
PGit is the price index of government consumption.
3.3 Generating sign restrictions
Since our VAR model is estimated on time series data for the European Union relative
to the U.S, we mainly focus on evidence for the European Union.
In this paper we try to derive plausible sign restrictions which meets the parametriza-
tion of all kind of standard models through the following procedure. First we assume that
confidence intervals are specified and we have uniform and independent distribution. Af-
terwards, we draw a entire of 100,000 realizations of the parameter vector. We have to
then calculate impulse responses to a government expenditure and a productivity gain
for each realization. In addition, we compute confidence bounds including 99 percent of
the impulse responses and eventually discover which variables react unambiguously no
matter positively or negatively after an specific shock for a k periods following that shock.
We follow Enders et al.(2011) in this paper who argue that “Computing the impulse re-
sponses for a large number of realizations of the parameter vector ensures the robustness
of our sign restrictions. Assuming a uniform distribution over the specified interval, we
consider the entire range of parameter values, while dismissing all values outside the in-
terval as implausible on a priori grounds. In order to dismiss very unlikely implications
of realizations of the parameter vector, we consider 99 percent coverage bands.”
We employ range of parameter values in order to simulate the model in hand.21
21For detailed explanation of how to compute these parameter values, see Enders et al.(2011) paper. In
their seminal paper they explain how they determine sign restrictions from model responses to positive
technology innovation and fiscal expansions under various parameterizations in detail. Table 1 in their
paper summarizes the whole procedure of parametrization.
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4 New evidence on the behavior of Euro Area real
exchange rates
4.1 Data and baseline specification
We estimate the VAR model (1) on time series data for the Euro Area relative to the U.S.
We include a constant and 4 lags of endogenous variables in the VAR model. The vector
of endogenous variables consists of, in logs and real terms, private consumption, GDP,
private investment, government spending as well as the primary budget balance scaled
by GDP, inflation (measured using the GDP deflator), the nominal short-term interest
rate and the log of the real exchange rate. Data for real output, private consumption,
government spending, the GDP deflator, and private fixed investment are taken from
the OECD Economic Outlook database. Government spending consists of government
spending on goods and services (government consumption), however it does not include
investment and transfers.22 The data ranges from 1975Q1 to 2007Q4. We dismiss the
first two troublesome years after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system.23
For all the variables we used the data for Euro Area relative to the U.S. However
exchange rate is an exception.24
We use our baseline specification and identify a shock in government spending together
with productivity gains while the backbone of our identification procedure is the sign
restrictions summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Expansionary Innovations in Euro Area
Variables Government Spending Technology Shock
Consumption unrestricted +8
Output +2 +8
Investment -4 +4
Gov.Spending +4 unrestricted
Gov.Budget -4 +0
Interest Rate +4 -4
Inflation +0 -0
Exchange Rate Unrestricted unrestricted
22Additionally, we use the same source of data to achieve the short-term interest rate, the government
balance (measured in percent of GDP), exports of goods and services (value, local currency), imports
of goods and services (value, local currency), and GDP (market prices) for the U.S. Net exports, as a
fraction of GDP, are computed on the basis of these series. For the Euro area we obtain several series
from the ECB’s AWM database. For more details of where to get relevant data, see Fagan et al.(2001)
and Enders et al.(2011). We take the CPI-based real effective exchange rate for the U.S. from the Main
Economic Indicators of the OECD.
23Euro area growth rates consists of West-Germany for just before 1990Q4, and unified Germany from
1991Q1 afterwards.
24We apply the short-term interest rate (STN), the deflator of exports of goods and services (XTD),
the deflator of imports of goods and services (MTD), and the government primary surplus (GPN-YEN).
In case OECD data is used, similar adjustments have been applied in constructing the AWM database.
Weights are based on PPP adjusted values for the year 2000, as reported in the World Economic Outlook
database (2007) of the IMF.
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4.2 Empirical results
Figs. 1 to 16 shows the impulse responses to the shocks in government spending and
technology given the estimated VAR model. We can see in all the figures the median
and also the 16% and 84% quantiles of the posterior distribution of impulse responses.
Crucially the results are considered as “significant” whenever both quantiles are either
above or below zero at a specific point in time. The horizontal axis shows periods (in
quarters) after each shock while the vertical axis, on the other hand, represents the
percentage that the responses depart from its baseline values. We show the periods in
which we impose sign restriction as shaded area in the figures.
Figures 1 to 8 shows the impulse responses of the variables in the model to an expan-
sionary shock in government expenditure. The impulse responses of all variables display
the response of relative variables to a domestic innovations25 however the only exception
is real exchange rate which shows the reaction of the domestic variable. Relative gov-
ernment expenditure increases persistently for almost 12 quarters. However it is likely
to decrease in later periods. Enders et al. (2011) argue that this happens as a result
of systematic cut in response to higher public debt. GDP rises for nearly three quarters
on impact however it also falls afterwards. Succeeding the evidence reported by Per-
otti (2005) for a post-1980 data and also by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Enders et
al.(2011) for the U.S, this paper shows a very temporary expansion in output as a result
of government spending shocks this time for Euro Area. Indeed, GDP increases just for
the period that its respond is restricted to be non-negative. In contrast to the case of US,
however, GDP keeps falling for all the periods following a fiscal shock. The government
budget deteriorates for at least 14 quarters. Private consumption, in the same manner,
decreases for the most period of the study however after an initial rapid increase which
lasts for 8 months. Gali et al. (2007) suggest that private consumption rises after an
increase in government expenditure only if there is either a labor market friction or when
the majority of individuals consume disposable rather than permanent income. Our re-
sults document that government spending crowds out private investment for the whole
period and reduces inflation after it increases initially for roughly 5 quarters. Therefore,
investment decline, while inflation rises slightly for 5 quarter and then declines. Interest
rates, in turn, increase initially as long as they are restricted to respond non-negatively,
but falls constantly thereafter. The reaction of real exchange rate after the shock is that it
appreciates ( falls) continually. The size of these exchange rate dynamics, however, is not
considerable. Under standard assumptions, exchange rate appreciates following an expan-
sionary government spending in business cycle models as well as textbook modifications
of the Mundell-Fleming model. As discussed in methodology section, we do not restrict
exchange rate impulse responses and as a result, we find interesting evidences: align with
standard models of exchange rate behavior, an expansionary government spending appre-
ciates (decreases) the real exchange rate. Furthermore, this finding is in contrast with the
number of studies which investigate the same issue using different identification schemes.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify their model assuming that government spending is
predetermined. Kim and Roubini (2008) as well as Monacelli and Perotti (2006) analyze
U.S. data and Australia, the U.S., the U.K and Canada respectively. They find evidence
that government spending shocks depreciate the real exchange rate. Canada, however,
25This means that variables are the difference between the reaction of a domestic variable (here Eu-
ropean Union) and its foreign partner (United States). We used relative variables in this paper since we
focus on the behavior of the real exchange rate, which is defined by these relative variables.
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was an exception26.
Figs 9-16 reveals how our variables reacts to a technology shock, i.e., productivity
gain. Government spending decreases initially for nearly 6 quarters however rises for 20
quarters afterwards. The budget does not decrease on impact and indeed increases for
the whole period. Enders et al. (2011) generate the same result for the US and argue
that it is likely to be the byproduct of the fact that tax revenues are procyclical. The
response of consumption is positive for the whole period. GDP increases for the intial 12
quarters howevers it falls sharply afterwards. Private investment responses increases for
16 quarters before its start to fall. Nominal interest rate, as the model imposes, falls for
6 quarters however it starts to increase afterwards for nearly 10 quarters before it starts
to fall sharply again. Inflation after a technology shock follows the pattern of nominal
interest rate.
Real exchange rate after a technology shock, similar to that of fiscal policy, appreciates
(falls) for most of the periods however after an initial depreciation which lasts for 9
quarters. One of the exceptions of the standard collaboration of the RBC model is called
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The Balassa-Samuelson effect argues that exchange rate
may appreciate following an improvement in the technology of the production of traded
goods. This happens through the impact of these technology shocks on the price of non-
traded goods. 0ur results, in line with Balassa-Samuelson effect, document that exchange
rates appreciate (fall) considerably in most quarters after a productivity gain however
after an on impact depreciation which lasts for 10 quarters. These movements of exchange
rate, on the other hand, contrasts evidences obtained from the rest of the litrature which
use long-run restrictions to identify technology shocks. The exchange rate medium-term
movements in this paper shows that exchange rate depreciates (increases) just for the
several initial quarters. Subsequently, the exchange rate falls beyond its steady-state
level before the shock happens. The same medium-term patterns for the exchange rate
is also confirmed in the study of Enders et al. (2011) for the US.
4.3 Our Results and further issues in the literature
This paper investigates the dynamic response of a series of euro area macroeconomic
variables to fiscal policy and technology shocks employing structural VAR models. The
similar studies for the euro area, however, mostly concentrate on monetary policy rather
than fiscal policy. For instance, Peersman and Smets (2001) merely analyze monetary
policy shocks, and Peersman and Straub (2004) estimate both monetary and technology
shocks using model-based sign restrictions. In contrast to those papers, we identify
fiscal policy shocks as well as technology shock simultaneously by imposing theoretically-
consistent restrictions in line with Enders et al.(2011).
The identification of impulse responses that built on structural VAR models aims
not just at calculating the properties of the data. It also tends to determine the set of
shocks that should be integrated in dynamic general equilibrium models. A controversial
debate in the literature is to understand the impacts of positive technology shocks on
26Beetsma et al. (2008) employed a methogology suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to iden-
tify shocks in the Euro Area. Their results suggest that the real exchange rate appreciates after an
expansionary government expenditure in this area. This methodology according to the litrature is a
well-documented substitution to the Blanchard-Perotti method. Monacelli and Perotti (2006) used the
same identification approach and report that government spending decreases, while the real exchange
rate depreciates. They argue that this happens as a result of the Carter-Reagan military build-up.
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main economic indicators such as hours worked under different specifications.27
Sousa et al. (2012) investigate the impacts of a one-standard deviation positive tech-
nology shock and argue that it induce a steady increase in the output. Furthermore,
wages, consumption and investment also react positively to a technology shock. These
results has been confirmed in most benchmark theories. The difference between their
study and ours, however, is that they study the impact of monetary policy together with
technology shock while our focus is on the effects of fiscal policy and technology shock.
We also find a continuing development in private consumption after a technology shock
however GDP and private investment merely increases for initial 12 and 16 quarters re-
spectively following the shock and then they start to fall till the very end of the period.
Both studies affirm each other on the reaction of inflation to a technology shock. Infla-
tion’s reaction is mainly contemporaneous and the largest response happens on impact.
Besides, this reaction is not statistically important and it is not different from zero28.
They finally conclude that positive technology shocks create a permanent drop in the
number of labor input employed in the economy. Sousa et al. (2012) finally suggest
that hours worked are procyclical which calls into question the reliability of the RBC
paradigm. Indeed, if productivity gains were the major drivers of business cycles in the
economy then their VAR results would show a negative relationship of hours worked and
output growth and not the positive one evidenced in their study, (Enders et al. (2011))29.
Christiano et al.(2003), as well, show that a technology shocks induce an increase in con-
sumption, investment and output. Hours per capital’s reaction, however, is in a sharp
contrast with the evidences reported in a large body of literature in which per capita
hours worked decreases following a positive technology shock. These papers utilize a
reduced form time series models employing minimal identifying assumptions to estimate
a technology sock’s impact on the economy. Their results are significant since they cast
doubt upon the basic properties of many structural business cycle models which imply
that per capita hours worked increase after a permanent shock to technology. Concur-
rently, they imply that permanent technology shocks does not have any significant role in
explaining business cycle fluctuations. After all, technology might produce quantitatively
significant impacts if one accepts the traditional growth models theories. Dedola and Neri
(2007), furthermore, examine U.S time series data for the postwar period and argue that
a positive technology shock push U.S. hours worked per capita after one year. Contrary
to Christiano et al.(2003), their results confirm the significant role of a technology shock
in determining output dynamics and are in line with the predictions of standard RBC
models. One of the main differences between DeDola and Neri (2007) and Christiano et
al.(2003) is that the former use sign-restriction approach in identifying the technology
shock.
In the fiscal policy literature, we investigate the impacts of the changes in government
expenditure on key economic indicators such as private consumption. This is a crucial
issue since fiscal policy is believed by policy makers to have an important impact on
individuals’ welfare given that private consumption is the largest portion of the aggregate
27Several studies have been done in this regard, namely Basu and Kimball (2004) and Gali (2004). Also
see Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) for a compehensive study of the reliability of identifying technology
shocks using long-run restrictions on a VARs.
28In their model however, they also include per capita hours and show that it seems to fall permanently
which is similar to the one reported by Gali (2004) for the euro area.
29Their results from VARs model which are based on restrictions are in line with the conclusions
reported in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2004), the response of hours to a technology shock
would also change substantially if hours worked were found to be stationary.
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demand. Macroeconomic theories, in contrast, do not have a universal opinion about the
welfare implications of the fiscal shocks. According to the textbook Keynesian theories,
private consumption increases following a positive shock in government spending. It is
however argued that the impact of a fiscal policy shock on aggregate output depends on
the changes in investment. Additionally, investment broadly relies on the monetary policy
determination of the interest rate. This model assumes that economic agents maximize
their utility function and finance their consumption out of their present income. Most
modern-day macroeconomic models, on the other hand, follow the neoclassical theories
and assume that consumers are infinitely lived consumption-smoothing agents. These
models predict a fall in consumption following an increase in government expenditure
through negative wealth effect. This effect comes from the fact that economic agents
predict an increase in tax rates in future by governments in order to finance their current
fiscal expansions. The empirical literature, however, provide conflicting answer to the
question of the impact of fiscal policy on consumption.
Gali et al. (2007) and Erceg et al. (2006) suggest that their results confirm the
presence of the “hand-to-mouth” consumers who their consumption behavior leads to
the crowding in of the private investment. A study by Rossi et al. (2004), however, could
not find enough support for the Gali et al. (2007) findings after replicating their results by
assuming that individuals are rule-of-thumb consumers if taxation is distortionary instead
of being lump-sum. Our results in this paper, in contrast, shows that consumption falls
following an on impact increase of this variable which merely lasts for 8 quarters after an
expansionary government expenditure. Coenen et al. (2007a) also shows an increase in
consumption following an expansionary fiscal shock which is negligible. Horvath (2009),
align with this paper, notice that an increase in private consumption after a rise in
government expenditure is not generally an character of the economy under optimal
stabilization. This holds even when one’s definition of the consumer behavior is different
from conventional macroeconomic theories. Indeed, he argues that a “crowding-in” effect
of consumption following a government expansion merely happens in situations that might
be hard to reconcile with realities in advanced countries.
5 conclusion
In this paper, we investigate international relative prices and its impact on the behavior of
a couple of important economic variables after an expansionary government expenditure
and technology shock in Euro Area. More specifically, the center of interest here is on the
effects of productivity gains and fiscal shocks on exchange rate. The real exchange rate is
an important factor since it contains important information regarding the international
transmission mechanism, (Enders et al. (2011)). Furthermore, the role of fiscal shocks
and technology shocks altogether in particular had not previously been studied in the
case of the Euro Area. The results in this literature to a large extent depend on the
estimated VAR models in which identification is obtained either by short-run or long-run
restrictions. These models are widely just based on a standard collaborations, which
exclusively provides evidences by construction. We employ sign restrictions derived from
the DSGE models in this paper in order to identify structural shocks and more specifically
technology shock. More importantly, the existing evidence on the reaction of exchange
rate following a technology and government spending shocks is controversial and and
seems to call into question the predictions of international business cycle models.
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We document evidences for 15 countries in the Euro Area using a different identifica-
tion method which involves Bayesian econometrics and sign restrictions. For obtaining
robust sign restrictions, following Enders et al. (2011) we achieve 100,000 simulations
of parameters based on a quantitative business cycle. To identify shock simultaneously,
several variables have been restricted by our identification scheme while we leave the
response of the exchange rates to be determined by the data. Standard models predict
that government spending and technology shocks appreciate and depreciate exchange
rates respectively. Our results confirm the predictions of the benchmark models about
the exchange rate in particular about the impact of fiscal policy. We could not, however,
find enough support for the alternative calibrations of these models which assumed a low
trade price elasticity.
Assessing a VAR model on time series data for the Euro Area relative to the U.S.
economy, the results suggest that expansionary government spending shocks appreciates
(decreases) the real exchange rate. Furthermore, the real exchange rate depreciates (in-
creases) after a positive technology shock however just for a short period of time. With
regard to the basics, our empirical results to some extent can justify the predictions of
standard business cycle models. More importantly, it seems like different parametriza-
tion of the model we used does not necessarily lead to different behavior of exchange rate
responses to both shocks. Corsetti et al. (2008a) document that robust wealth effects
after a technology shocks push the demand for domestic goods further than supply and
therefore appreciate the exchange rate.
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Figure 1: Europe’s Private Consumption Impulse Response Relative to the US after an
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 2: Europe’s Exchange Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after an Expan-
sionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 3: Europe’s GDP Impulse Response Relative to the US after an Expansionary
Fiscal Policy
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Figure 4: Europe’s Government Budget Impulse Response Relative to the US after an
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 5: Europe’s Government Spending Impulse Response Relative to the US after an
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 6: Europe’s Inflation Impulse Response Relative to the US after an Expansionary
Fiscal Policy
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Figure 7: Europe’s Interest Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after an Expan-
sionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 8: Europe’s Private Investment Impulse Response Relative to the US after an
Expansionary Fiscal Policy
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Figure 9: Europe’s Private Consumption Impulse Response Relative to the US after a
Technology Shock
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Figure 10: Europe’s Exchange Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after a Tech-
nology Shock
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Figure 11: Europe’s GDP Impulse Response Relative to the US after a Technology Shock
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Figure 12: Europe’s Government Budget Impulse Response Relative to the US after a
Technology Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
quarters
pe
rc
en
t
6
Figure 13: Europe’s Government Spending Impulse Response Relative to the US after a
Technology Shock
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Figure 14: Europe’s Inflation Impulse Response Relative to the US after a Technology
Shock
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Figure 15: Europe’s Interest Rate Impulse Response Relative to the US after a Technology
Shock
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Figure 16: Europe’s Private Investment Impulse Response Relative to the US after a
Technology Shock
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Figure 17: Variance Decomposition of Technology Shock
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